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In this short paper, which reflects on one of my contributions to the systems literature in 1992 
(Pluralism and the Legitimation of Systems Science), I discuss the context at that time. 
Systems scientists were embroiled in a paradigm war, which threatened to fragment the 
systems research community. This is relevant, not only to understanding my 1992 
contribution, but also because the same paradigms are evident in the complexity science 
community, and therefore it potentially faces the same risk of fragmentation. Having 
explained the context, I then go on to discuss my proposed solution to the paradigm war: that 
there are four domains of complexity, three of which reflect the competing paradigms. The 
problem comes when researchers say that inquiry into just one of these domains is valid. 
However, when we recognise all four as part of a new theory of complexity, we can view 
them as complementary. The four domains are natural world complexity, or “what is” (where 
the ideal of inquiry is truth); social world complexity, or the complexity of “what ought to 
be” in relation to actual or potential action (where the ideal of inquiry is rightness); subjective 
world complexity, or the complexity of what any individual (the self or another) is thinking, 
intending or feeling (where the ideal of inquiry is understanding subjectivity); and the 
complexity of interactions between elements of the other domains of complexity in the 
context of research and intervention practice. Following a discussion of the relevance of this 
theory for complexity scientists, I end the paper with a final critical reflection on my 1992 
paper, pointing to some theoretical assumptions and terminology that I would, in retrospect, 
revise. 
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I would like to start by thanking Kurt Richardson, the editor of Emergence: Complexity and 
Organization (E:CO), for asking me to write this introduction to my own paper, Pluralism 
and the Legitimation of Systems Science (Midgley, 1992a). It is very rare to have the 
opportunity to publically reflect, 25 years later, on one’s own older work, and I am honoured 
that Kurt considered the paper significant enough to be included in E:CO’s “classic papers” 
series.  
 Below, I will do three things. First, I will explain the context in which I wrote the paper, as 
the whole framing of it might be puzzling for those reading this in 2016 or later.  
 
Second, I will briefly summarise what I believe is of value in this paper for complexity 
theorists and practitioners. The paper was not intended as a contribution to the literature on 
complexity (it was primarily aimed at the systems science research community), but I was 
aware at the time that, if researchers were to follow up the implications for developing our 
understanding of complexity, it might lead complexity scientists down a considerably 
different road than the one that the majority have taken. This is now a chance to start that 
follow up discussion – better late than never!  
 
The third and final section below explains what I would do differently if I could go back 25 
years and write the paper again. Back then I was nearing the end of my doctoral studies, and 
this paper (Midgley, 1992a) and three others (Midgley, 1992b, 1996a, 2001) together 
summarize the arguments in my PhD dissertation (Midgley, 1992c). I smile now at the 
number of theoretical assumptions and uses of terminology that I would revise today, if 
writing the paper again with the benefit of hindsight.  
 
Having said this, I still believe that much of my 1992a analysis of four types of complexity 
stands up to scrutiny today, even if I now question some of the social/linguistic theory that I 
drew upon to develop it. Further, I reckon that the argument has practical implications for 





In the late 1980s and early 1990s, systems scientists were dealing with what might be termed 
an “existential crisis”, with the clashing of several incommensurable paradigms and a 
consequent fragmentation of their research community into competing camps. The history of 
this paradigm war is instructive, not just because it provided the context for my own 
contribution to the literature at that time, but also because we can see the same divisions in 
complexity science today (Midgley and Richardson, 2007), and hence the potential is there 
for the fragmentation of the complexity research community too.  
 
In brief, following the consolidation in the 1940s and 1950s of some important 
transdisciplinary theories in the fields of systems science (e.g., Angyal, 1941; von 
Bertalanffy, 1956; Boulding, 1956; Hall and Fagan, 1956), cybernetics (e.g., Wiener, 1948; 
Ashby, 1956; Bateson, 1967) and complexity science (e.g., Weaver, 1948; Simon, 1962), 
there was a push in the systems community to embody these theories in methodologies for 
intervention to support systemic organizational and social change. These methodologies 
included systems analysis (e.g., Quade and Boucher, 1968; Optner, 1973), systems 
engineering (e.g., Hall, 1962; Jenkins, 1969), system dynamics (e.g., Forrester, 1961, 1969) 
and viable system modelling (e.g., Beer, 1959, 1966). The authors of these methodologies 
tended to adopt an approach that assumed the need for expert-driven modelling of real world 
complex systems, and they strove for comprehensiveness in their models while emphasising 
quantification, prediction and control (Jackson, 1991).  
 
This whole approach ran into problems in the 1960s and 1970s, and strong criticisms were 
advanced of the assumptions built into it (Hoos, 1972; Lee, 1973; Lilienfeld, 1978; Ackoff, 
1979a). As a consequence, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw the emergence of a new 
paradigm with its own methodologies (e.g., Ackoff, 1981; Checkland, 1981; Mason and 
Mitroff, 1981; Rosenhead, 1989; Christakis and Bausch, 2006) based on very different 
assumptions. The expert researcher was replaced by a facilitator, whose role was to include 
stakeholders in participative, qualitative modelling (Rosenhead, 1989). The meaning of the 
term “expertise” was thereby democratized to refer to relevant knowledge held by those 
involved in and affected by a problematic situation (Churchman, 1970). The emphasis was no 
longer on systems as real world entities, but instead attention was switched to how 
collaborative groups could develop better systemic understandings of potential actions: a 
“system” became a useful way of viewing the world rather than something that can be 
assumed to exist objectively (Checkland, 1981). With this shift came recognition of the 
inevitable lack of comprehensiveness in every analysis (Churchman, 1970; Ulrich, 1983), and 
hence a relaxation in assumptions about prediction and control, with more of an emphasis on 
the need for better mutual understanding between stakeholders (Checkland, 1981), dialogue 
(Ulrich, 1983; Christakis and Bausch, 2006) and learning (Ackoff, 1979b; Checkland, 1985; 
de Geus, 1994; Sterman, 1994). It was at this time that the terminology of “hard” and “soft” 
systems was first proposed (Checkland, 1981), with hard systems methodologists being those 
who wanted experts to quantify analyses of real world systems, and soft systems 
methodologists being those who wanted facilitators to support dialogue around different ways 
of seeing systems and possible actions to change them. Thankfully, in more recent years, this 
divisive language has become largely redundant (Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001). 
 
Of course, the advocates of the first paradigm didn’t go away when the second one was 
proposed, and a paradigm war ensued. By the time we had hit the late 1980s, when I wrote 
my own first contributions to the literature on systems methodology (Midgley, 1989a,b, 
1990a,b), it was evident that the war was tearing the systems research community apart, with 
advocates of the different paradigms denigrating their opponents and refusing to participate in 
cross-boundary dialogues. It was in this context that a new paradigm called “critical systems 
thinking” was proposed (e.g., Flood and Jackson, 1991; Flood and Romm, 1996), and this 
had two principle aims: first, to deepen our understanding of how power relations can be 
addressed during intervention (e.g., Ulrich, 1983; Flood, 1990; Midgley, 1992b; Oliga, 1996), 
given that both previous paradigms were arguably rather naive in their analyses of power; and 
second, to develop an adequate theory and practice of methodological pluralism so we could 
transcend the paradigm war and draw upon the best from both previous paradigms to create a 
much more flexible and responsive approach to systemic intervention (e.g., Jackson and 
Keys, 1984; Jackson 1987a,b, 1991, 2000; Oliga, 1988; Flood, 1990, 1995; Flood and 
Jackson, 1991; Gregory, 1992, 1996a,b; Midgley, 1992a,c, 1997, 2000; Brocklesby, 1994, 
1997; Flood and Romm, 1996; Mingers and Brocklesby, 1996; Mingers and Gill, 1997).  
 My 1992a paper was a relatively early contribution to critical systems thinking, with a 
specific focus on developing a theory of complexity to underpin the practice of 
methodological pluralism, and thereby transcend the paradigm war. My proposal was for the 
identification of four domains of complexity, and the methods from the various competing 
methodologies could be aligned with these according to the ideal of inquiry they embodied. 
More details are provided below. It is my contention that this argument may be of value to 
complexity theorists and practitioners who may have to deal with paradigmatic divisions in 
the complexity research community along similar lines to those that were previously 
encountered and addressed in the systems community. 
 
The Value of the Paper for Complexity Theorists and Practitioners 
 
The four domains (or types) of complexity that I proposed in my 1992a paper were: 
1. “Natural world” complexity, or the complexity of “what is”. The ideal of inquiry into 
this form of complexity is truth – but note the term “ideal” which, following Popper 
(1959, 1972), indicates that truth is something we aim for, but we can never know for 
certain whether it has been achieved. 
2. “Social world” complexity, or the complexity of “what ought to be” in relation to 
actual or potential action. The ideal of inquiry into this form of complexity is 
rightness. 
3. “Subjective world” complexity, or the complexity of what any individual (the self or 
another) is thinking, intending or feeling. The ideal of inquiry into this form of 
complexity can be called understanding subjectivity. 
4. We very often have to deal with interactions between phenomena in the above three 
domains of complexity. This means that there is also the meta-level complexity of 
these interactions, which needs to be a focus of inquiry. However, it’s important to 
note that, in the context of intervention (rather than just observation), meta-level 
analyses may not stay “meta” for long: communication of them, and action upon 
them, may feed back to change the original pattern of interactions.  
 
In my 1992a paper, I drew upon Habermas’s (1976, 1984a,b) linguistic theory of ‘three 
worlds’ to underpin the first three of the above domains of complexity (the fourth comes 
about because the first three interact). In brief, Habermas argues that any sentence intended 
for communication has three implicit validity claims: a claim that its propositional content is 
true; that it is the right thing to say in the context; and that the speaker is sincere in saying it. 
These validity claims refer to three worlds: our external natural world; our normative social 
world; and my (or your) internal subjective world. According to Habermas, a rational, free 
and fair dialogue is one where anything that is said can, in principle, be opened up to critique 
on the basis of truth, rightness or sincerity. When some aspect of potential critique is 
repressed (for example when a company allows its employees to participate in discussing the 
means to achieve already-given ends, but those ends are not open for discussion), this 
produces ‘distorted communication’.  
 
In three short, logical steps, we can move from Habermas’s linguistic theory to my own 
proposal for the first three domains of complexity above. First, we can view Habermas’s 
three “worlds” as foci for research and inquiry, and not just rational argumentation in 
dialogue. Second, this broadening of the focus beyond dialogue means that we have to be 
concerned with more than just the sincerity of speakers when we consider subjectivity: it is 
the whole panoply of intentions, thoughts and feelings that come to be of interest in inquiry. 
Third, why would we need research and inquiry if there were no uncertainties, and hence 
underlying complexities, to deal with? Seeing Habermas’s “worlds” as the first three domains 
of complexity therefore makes sense – and, as we have seen, the fourth domain of complexity 
concerns how phenomena in the other domains interact.  
 
Now, Habermas (1984a,b) said his theory was ontological, as he claimed that it is the 
intrinsic properties of language that enable us to distinguish between the natural, social and 
subjective worlds. In 1992, I therefore labelled the fourth (meta) level of complexity 
‘ontological complexity’ to indicate that all three of the other forms of complexity and their 
interactions are essential to consider when dealing with any non-trivial issue requiring 
systemic action research: ignoring one or more of the domains will result in missing a 
significant source of complexity, and this will impoverish analysis, understanding and action. 
 
I think the implications of this for complexity theory are clear. There are now multiple 
complexity paradigms represented in the literature (Midgley and Richardson, 2007), and most 
of these focus on just one of the “worlds” identified in my 1992a paper. Indeed, it is arguably 
still the case that the majority concentrate on describing the generic characteristics of 
complex adaptive systems, network interactions, etc., and then either apply their theories to 
interpret empirical findings, or refine their theories through the analysis of findings. 
Essentially, they produce theories of “natural world” complexity, guided by the ideal of truth 
(acknowledging, of course, that their truth judgements are not absolute, as any reasonable 
scientist would). However, for the most part, they do not inquire into the normative social 
world of moral judgements concerning actions that people might want to take. The kind of 
research needed for this would be substantially different: in a particular context, it would 
involve exploring the complexities and uncertainties around possible human actions that 
people can envisage, and the perceived moral implications of these (Ulrich, 1983; Friend and 
Hickling, 2004); or the focus might be on how people’s values contribute to the setting of 
purposes that then limit their framing of issues, and both values and framings can be shifted 
through action research (Cilliers, 1998; Midgley, 2000). Because the social world is about 
what “ought to be” in the context of action, exploring these things in action research mode 
makes sense. It is also worth asking, how much complexity research has a focus on the purely 
subjective perspectives of individuals? As far as I am aware, there is very little, although 
Snowden (2010) is a notable exception, advocating the collection of multiple individuals’ 
stories and then looking for patterns across these. There are major opportunities for 
developing new theories relating to the social and subjective complexity domains, and the 
biggest challenge of all is arguably to produce theories that explain repeating patterns in the 
interactions between the three types of complexity. We might thereby be able to offer generic 
insights into the fourth (meta) domain of complexity, as well as enable bespoke analyses of 
the interactions that are relevant to particular local and temporary contexts of practice.  
 
For complexity practice, the distinction between the four domains could also be valuable. 
Remember that, in 1992, I advocated the theory of the four domains of complexity to support 
methodological pluralism: drawing upon and mixing methods from across a range of systems 
(and other) approaches. It would be possible to reinterpret and harmonize the existing 
complexity paradigms in terms of the first three domains of complexity (concerning the 
natural, social and subjective worlds), thereby making them complementary. It is then 
reflecting on the interactions between the three types of complexity (i.e., beginning to get to 
grips with the fourth domain of complexity) in any action research project that can guide the 
mixing of methods to support inquiry and change in practice.  
 
While the systems research community has placed considerable emphasis on the development 
of methodologies and methods to support systemic inquiry over the past 60 years (Jackson, 
1991, 2000; Midgley, 2000, 2003; Reynolds and Holwell, 2010), I suggest that less emphasis 
has been placed on this by complexity scientists. Methodology and methods provide a bridge 
from theory to practice, and more concentration on this by complexity scientists would be 
useful – not just to inform practice with complexity theories of the natural world, but to 
support the exploration of normative and subjective complexities too. 
 
Reflections on Theoretical Assumptions and Terminology with the Benefit of Hindsight 
 
Having said earlier that I still believe that much of this theory of the four domains of 
complexity stands up to scrutiny today, it is perhaps unsurprising that I would now, with 25 
years of hindsight, choose to change some assumptions and terminology. 
 
Over the years, I have developed an increasing scepticism of “grand theories”: sweeping 
theories of universals in human nature and society (see Skinner, 1985, for an examination of 
grand theories in the social sciences). For a start, many theories of supposedly “universal” 
characteristics of human beings or societies have been found to be culture dependent in light 
of evidence from comparative anthropology. Perhaps the most famous recent example 
concerns colour perception, where it now appears that discriminating between colours has a 
lot to do with expectations of colour distinctions established in linguistic categories that have 
evolved in particular ecological and social contexts (Roberson et al, 2002). One of the 
problems with grand theories is that a lot of the particular, unique complexity in social 
situations is passed over in favour of relatively simple generic observations: almost the 
reverse of the old adage that “we cannot see the wood for the trees”. With grand theories, it’s 
mostly wood and the trees become blurred. 
 
Even when I wrote my 1992a paper (and indeed my 1992c PhD thesis, which I was writing at 
the same time), I struggled with a dilemma. I was unsure whether or not to accept 
Habermas’s (1976, 1984a,b) ontology, which (in the typical manner of a grand theory) roots 
categories of inquiry in the universal properties of language. I was advocating 
methodological pluralism, and of course different methodologies draw upon different 
(sometimes incompatible) theories, so would it then be contradictory to say that there is one 
theory of language that can organize all the methodological diversity?  
 
In the end I found a way through this. As I saw it, simply accepting a diversity of 
methodological paradigms and saying we can draw upon them pragmatically as we see fit 
meant also accepting all the incommensurable philosophical assumptions that come with 
those paradigms. Can we credibly say that our knowledge reflects a real world (the 
epistemological assumption of much “hard” systems science) and also, at the same time, 
believe that we only have access to our subjective and inter-subjective understandings, which 
cannot necessarily be assumed to reflect anything real at all (the epistemology of much “soft” 
systems thinking)? Surely this leaves us in a philosophical muddle. This is plurality without 
any theory that explains how and why the various aspects of the plurality are valid or 
legitimate. I therefore decided, after much reflection, to go for a unifying theory through 
which the plurality of methods (not methodologies, with all their accompanying, potentially 
incommensurate theories) could be explained. I argued that any unifying ontology had to be 
‘multi-faceted’ in order to have the requisite variety to contextualize methods drawn from 
different paradigms (Midgley, 1992a, p.169). I therefore moved beyond Habermas’s purely 
linguistic theory, arguing that the external natural world, the normative social world and our 
internal subjective worlds all exist, and indeed it is possible to show that the existence of each 
of them is dependent on the existence of the other two (Midgley, 1992a, p.160-161).  
 
The other issue I struggled with at the time of writing my 1992a paper, but I ended up 
ignoring my first instincts on this, was that judgements concerning beauty cannot be reduced 
to one of the three ideals of inquiry: truth, rightness and understanding subjectivity. Where 
did aesthetic judgement fit in Habermas’s analysis of the inherent validity claims in any 
sentence intended for communication? I was already aware that Habermas’s ontology could 
be viewed as a “grand theory”, which might not be such a good thing, and the fact that beauty 
wasn’t recognised as an ideal of inquiry suggested that his theory could be overly reductive. 
 
Although I set aside these concerns about aesthetics in 1992, it finally dawned on me in the 
late 1990s that I had been right to be concerned. I set out to write a history of systems 
thinking in a chapter of a book (Midgley, 2000), and I was discussing how three long-
standing traditions had informed the various systems paradigms: pure science (which tried to 
establish truth claims), applied science (which was also concerned with truth, but with a view 
to informing right action) and psychoanalysis (which is much more focused on understanding 
the subjective perspectives of individuals). It suddenly occurred to me that what Habermas 
might have done when he produced his ontology was to observe the major analytical 
traditions that mattered to him in society and then reflected the validity claims associated 
with those traditions in his theory of the universals of language! Although I cannot prove that 
his logic went in this direction (from the analytical traditions to the ontology, rather than the 
other way around), it makes some sense of the way in which Habermas (1976, 1984a,b) talks 
about those traditions; and the absence of beauty as an ideal of inquiry is arguably because 
Habermas does not view art and aesthetics as a major analytical tradition in the same sense as 
the sciences and psychoanalysis.  
 
So today I am left feeling somewhat equivocal about my 1992a argument. On the one hand, I 
think that the idea of four domains of complexity stands up to scrutiny and could be useful 
for understanding how complexity science could develop into the future. On the other hand, I 
am much more critical than I once was of Habermas’s (1984a,b) linguistic ontology, although 
I was already looking for ways to go beyond this in 1992 (such as viewing the natural, social 
and subjective worlds as real rather than as mere reflections of the universal capacities of 
language). It might be more appropriate to simply think about historical traditions, such as 
science (oriented to the ideal of truth), politics (oriented to the ideal of rightness) and therapy 
(which, when undertaken with individuals, is oriented to the ideal of understanding 
subjectivity), and we can then argue that these are embodied in the first three complexity 
domains, with the fourth domain being concerned with their interaction. With this 
introductory paper, I am putting both interpretations into the literature, and I leave it to the 
reader to judge which is the most useful and appropriate. 
 
Incidentally, one other thing that I would change about my 1992 paper is discussion of 
‘ecological harmony’ (Midgley, 1992a, page 150). Gunderson and Holling (2002) 
persuasively argue that ecological systems cycle between periods of conservation (when the 
complexity of interrelationships grows steadily over time), release (when there is an external 
perturbation and the complexity of interrelationships makes the ecosystem “brittle” and 
vulnerable, causing some of these interrelationships to break), reorganization (when fresh 
interrelationships are formed), exploitation (when new complexity starts to burgeon quickly), 
and back to conservation again. In the context of this dynamic pattern, Gunderson and 
Holling argue that the word “harmony” connotes the maintenance of an equilibrium that does 
not actually exist. In retrospect, I would perhaps have talked about living within sustainable 




In conclusion, I recommend my 1992a paper to you, with the proviso that you read it 
critically, understanding that it is a product of its time. My hope is that the basic argument for 
four domains of complexity is still relevant now for researchers asking where complexity 
theory remains under-developed and could go in the future.  
 
I also hope that the argument for methodological pluralism is just as relevant for complexity 
practitioners as practitioners in the systems community. Certainly this paper, and many other 
books and papers on critical systems thinking (see especially Flood and Jackson, 1991; 
Jackson, 1991, 2000; Flood and Romm, 1996; Mingers and Gill, 1997; and Midgley, 2000), 
helped us win the argument for methodological pluralism in the systems community. While 
there are still live debates about the theory underpinning the practice of methodological 
pluralism (e.g., Zhu, 2011), it is undoubtedly the case that most people now accept it as 
preferable to both a paradigm war and the limitations on practice that come with believing 
that only a narrow range of methods has validity. If complexity scientists need to transcend a 
paradigm war themselves in coming years, they do not need to start with a clean slate: there is 
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